



**Indigenous Belief in a Just World:  
New Zealand Māori and other  
Ethnicities Compared**

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## **Abstract**

Survey evidence has revealed large differences in beliefs held by different cultures and ethnicities which may affect their economic prosperity. We study how the beliefs of New Zealand's indigenous Māori about the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate differ from non-Māori using World Values Survey data from 1995 to 2011. Māori are more likely to believe that (1) the poor have been unfairly treated and are not lazy; (2) a better life is due to luck and not hard work; (3) the Government is doing too little for those in need; and (4) business should not be run solely by the owners, compared to non-Māori. We control for income, education and employment status, inter alia. The paper also compares differences between Māori and non-Māori within NZ to those between (non-indigenous) blacks and non-blacks within the US, as a benchmark. Stark results hold with respect to non-economic beliefs: whereas Māori are 8.6% more likely to believe that the environment should be given priority over economic growth compared to non-Māori, blacks are 20.5% less likely to hold this view compared to other Americans. Hence the evidence suggests that being indigenous plays a role in belief formation.

## **JEL codes**

P16, E62

## **Keywords**

culture, beliefs, institutions

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# 1. Introduction

Striking differences in economic outcomes exist within New Zealand (NZ) for the indigenous Māori population relative to the non-Māori population, and particularly relative to the dominant population group which is of European extraction (commonly termed Pākehā). In 2006, for instance, one-family households with children that included Māori adults had a median equivalised household income that was 74% of the equivalent figure for households with no Māori adults.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, outcomes for a wide range of broader social indicators show considerable relative disadvantage for Māori relative to others in the population. For example, life expectancy for Māori is, at present, seven years less compared to non-Māori, and over half of the prison population is Māori, in spite of Māori representing around 15% of the population.<sup>2</sup> Similar differences have been found to exist in the US between the black and non-black population. In both NZ and the US, a large literature has sought to explain the reasons behind these kinds of ethnicity-based differentials.

One reason, often highlighted, is the lower educational achievement amongst Māori.<sup>3</sup> Without diminishing the importance of education, this paper concentrates on another point of difference that may explain different outcomes. Specifically, we analyse whether certain beliefs and values differ systematically between Māori and non-Māori. The economic (and some of the non-economic) beliefs and values that we examine have been linked consistently in the international literature to the adoption of particular individual actions that may affect economic outcomes. For example, a person who believes that the world is not ‘just’ (perhaps in the sense of not believing that success comes from individual effort but instead is due to luck and connections) may not be motivated to seek educational achievements in the first place, nor see the point of working hard at a job.

A person’s beliefs and values form a part of their culture. A distinguished tradition in social science, particularly important in sociology since the work of Max Weber, has considered culture as a key determinant of individual effort and the overall quality of the formal institutions that support market friendly exchange (e.g., Weber, 1946). The ‘values paradigm’ in sociology assumes that “culture can shape action by supplying ultimate ends or values toward which action is directed, thus making values the central causal element of culture” (see Swidler, 1986, p273). For example, cultures that emphasize materialism and individualism may have very different economic development paths from those ones that don’t place much value on the accumulation of wealth and individual success. For the purposes of our paper, it is important to note that a common set of formal institutions (rules, laws, constitutions) at the national level does not

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<sup>1</sup> See Kiro (2010).

<sup>2</sup> In the 2013 census in NZ, 74% of the population identified with at least one European ethnicity, 15% identified with Māori ethnicity, 12% with at least one Asian ethnicity, 7% with at least one Pacific Island ethnicity, and 1% with some other ethnicity. The totals sum to more than 100% due to some individuals identifying with more than one ethnicity (source: Statistics New Zealand).

<sup>3</sup> In 1971, only 12% of Māori school-leavers held sixth form certificate or above (Coleman et al, 2005). By 2012, the proportion who passed the equivalent qualification, NCEA Level 2, had risen to 54% but this figure compared with a non-Māori pass-rate of 74% (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2014). Using 2001 data, Sin and Maré (2004) showed that differences in qualifications account for 29% of the gap in incomes between Māori and European incomes.

necessarily generate a uniform culture. Immigrant and minority groups, for example, may hold very different beliefs and values from the dominant culture. Along these lines, one of the ways that researchers have measured the role of culture, holding institutions constant, is by looking at the way immigrants from different countries behave in the same destination country.

Our paper finds that Māori have a significantly different distribution of economic beliefs and values from non-Māori. We use, for the first time, World Values Survey data to identify these differences within the NZ context. For example, Māori are 11.5% more likely to believe that the causes of wealth come from connections and luck, instead of individual effort, and are 18.2% more likely to believe that the poor have been unfairly treated, compared to non-Māori. These beliefs are accompanied by a greater expectation that the State should help those in poverty. Some of these differences are also found when comparing the economic beliefs of minority groups in other countries, like blacks in the US, to the non-black population. This raises the question as to whether there are other kinds of beliefs that more uniquely distinguish Māori. For example, maybe being indigenous creates certain cultural differences compared to non-indigenous groups. We find evidence for this proposition in the sense that one important non-economic belief of Māori differs markedly from that of blacks in the US. Specifically, whereas Māori are more likely to emphasize protecting the environment (even at the cost of economic growth) compared to non-Māori, the reverse is true for black Americans. That is, blacks strongly support giving *less* priority to the environment, compared to non-blacks.

Aside from the potential of the different beliefs and values of Māori that we identify to help account for different outcomes, our survey evidence also has relevance for the optimal design of institutions within NZ. Given the dispersion of beliefs that make up NZ culture, creating a common set of formal rules for the whole population becomes harder. For example, our World Values Survey findings suggest that Māori beliefs are more aligned with giving importance to collectivism, non-materialism, the environment and kinship ties, compared to non-Māori. Māori are more likely to believe that owners of firms should *not* be given free rein to run them (and other groups, like employees, should be involved); that capitalists are the most threatening group to society; and that the environment should get priority over economic growth. Some of these cultural traits may explain why Māori enterprises appear to be built more on a stakeholder approach, rather than a shareholder approach, the latter being the dominant form of governance of firms in the Anglo-Saxon world (i.e., in countries like the UK, US, Australia and NZ).

The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide some background as to how certain cultural norms and institutions that are relevant to Māori versus non-Māori may affect economic outcomes. We also provide background on Māori economic institutions and outcomes compared to those of the general population in NZ. Section 3 discusses our World Values Survey (WVS) data and empirical approach to testing whether beliefs and values that are relevant to behaviour differ between Māori and non-Māori. Section 4 presents our empirical results. In order to provide an external benchmark for any

patterns of difference that emerge across ethnicities within NZ, we apply the same techniques to compare black and non-black respondents within the US. In section 5, we link our empirical results regarding beliefs to issues of governance and institutional design within both Māori organisations and the wider society.

## 2. Background

### 2.1. Culture and Institutions

Alesina and Giuliano (2015) define ‘culture’ as being “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” and review the work on how culture affects, and is affected by, a nation’s institutions.<sup>4</sup> North (1990) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, convention, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.” In North’s theory, formal rules are created by the polity, whereas informal norms are “part of the heritage that we call culture”.<sup>5</sup> As Alesina and Giuliano (2015) point out, the problem with this definition of “institutions” is that it overlaps too much with culture, since “norms” and “conventions” are used to define both institutions and culture. Given this ambiguity, when we refer to institutions we mean formal institutions (i.e., formal legal systems, formal regulation) and when we refer to culture we mean beliefs and values (one could say ‘informal rules’). This approach is the one followed by Alesina and Giuliano (2015) and also in most of the empirical papers trying to disentangle the two concepts.

While some early studies showed that cultural attitudes are slow to change, a recent comprehensive study by Giavazzi et al (2014) shows that persistence in cultural attitudes (e.g., of migrants to the US) differs across attitudinal categories and by country of origin. Of relevance to our study, attitudes related to family values (for example, the importance of obedience of a child) are shown to be strongly persistent across generations whereas attitudes towards issues such as redistribution and the importance of work versus luck for success display relatively strong convergence amongst migrants to the dominant culture. The speed of attitudinal convergence towards the societal norm depends in part on the strength of the family (or kin) as a social organisation, with weaker ties being associated with stronger convergence (since vertical transmission of attitudes within families is weaker).<sup>6</sup> A number of studies show that aspects of culture differ within countries either as a result of migrant groups retaining cultural attitudes from their source society or as a result of regional variations within countries. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) conclude

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<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Bowles, 1998.

<sup>5</sup> Other disciplines have long placed emphasis on culture, for instance Weber (1905) in sociology and Tylor (1871) in anthropology. Within modern sociology, Bourdieu and Passeron (1973) pioneered the concept of ‘cultural capital’ which includes customs transmitted across generations within societies.

<sup>6</sup> This finding mirrors the early work of Bourdieu and Passeron (1973) who regard ‘cultural capital’ as a form of knowledge, skills, education and advantages that a person possesses, and which parents transmit to their children through shaping their attitudes and knowledge which in turn affects their outcomes within the educational system.

that national institutions do not necessarily generate a uniform culture. Few studies examine the convergence of minority indigenous group attitudes towards those of a dominant settler group (Belich, 2009) which is our focus in analysing differences between Māori and non-Māori attitudes within NZ.

The importance of culture for economic outcomes emerges across a number of dimensions.<sup>7</sup> A variety of studies surveyed by Alesina and Giuliano (2015) shows that greater emphasis on individualism (relative to collectivism) translates into greater emphasis on personal achievements to obtain advancement, thus also emphasizing entrepreneurial activities and innovation.<sup>8</sup> The strength of family ties correlates with strong trust and cooperation within the family network but with weaker ties to other portions of society.<sup>9</sup> Strong family ties tend to translate into an industrial structure based on family (or kinship) firms. Often such firms tend to under-perform relative to others for reasons including a tendency towards greater risk-aversion and also the use of the firm as a quasi-social security provider to provide jobs within the relevant kinship group (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bloom and van Reenan, 2007). In addition, Alesina and Giuliano (2015) discuss how strong family ties may reduce geographic labour market mobility, leaving pockets of unemployed or under-employed people in declining areas, while strong family ties are also associated with a lack of political participation. Both outcomes appear relevant to Māori.<sup>10</sup>

Another important economic dimension affected by culture relates to attitudes towards work and poverty. Alesina and Giuliano (2015) summarise evidence showing that beliefs in personal success being determined more by luck than hard work tend to be associated with lower social mobility. However, Di Tella et al (2007) show that this belief is not immutable. They examine the impact on beliefs of the allocation of land titles to squatters in Buenos Aires. Those squatters who received land titles subsequently held beliefs about the workings of the free market that were statistically indistinguishable from the general community, whereas those squatters who did not receive land titles retained significantly less pro-market beliefs. While this kind of individual experience may affect beliefs and hence economic outcomes, it is also the case that deeply ingrained cultural norms matter for societal outcomes. Using African data, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) test for the effects of ethnicity versus national borders, and hence national institutions. They establish that if ethnicity (as a proxy for culture) is included as an explanatory variable then national institutions have no discernible effect on local economic performance. Given these findings, we provide background from previous studies on Māori beliefs and values, and on Māori relative economic and social outcomes, in the next section.

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) who correlate different measures of beliefs with economic growth rates across countries and compare them with institutional and geographical determinants of income.

<sup>8</sup> For a theory of collective beliefs that helps explain why many people feel a need to believe that we live in a “just” world where individual effort pays off and the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in levels of redistribution, labor supply, aggregate income, and popular perceptions of the poor, see Benabou and Tirole (2006).

<sup>9</sup> Consistent with this observation, empirical work has found stronger family ties for Māori compared to non-Māori. Roskrug et al., 2012 and 2013, report lower levels of generalised trust of others amongst Māori, controlling for personal characteristics.

<sup>10</sup> The correlation coefficient across New Zealand regions for the percentage of regional population that is Māori and the regional unemployment rate in 2013-14 is 0.83 (data source: MBIE, 2014). Voter turnout in the Māori electorates in the 2014 general election was 65% compared with 79% for the general electorates (source: Electoral Commission, “Electoral Results”, 2014).

## 2.2. Māori Beliefs and Values

Historical accounts of Māori life suggest conflicting views as to the importance of various types of family ties. Firth (1959) cites Elsdon Best's view that the nuclear family was of little importance in Māori society.<sup>11</sup> Best noted that children are often raised by a relation within the wider kinship group rather than by biological parents. By contrast, Firth (1959) places more weight on the importance of the nuclear family in his account of Māori family life. Nevertheless, both authors stress the over-riding importance of whānau (extended family), hapū (sub-tribe) and iwi (tribe) links.<sup>12</sup> In particular, the role of the tribal chief (ariki) was of vital importance, and the chief's rank and influence depended on his whakapapa (genealogy):

*"The rank of a chief, his prestige and authority were primarily due to his position by descent. He could trace his ancestry back through a long line of noted forebears, comprising people of seniority and influence. Great regard was given ... to primogeniture, and the most prized genealogy of all was the "aho ariki", the consistent line of descent through first-born sons"* (ibid, pp. 131-132).<sup>13</sup>

Firth shows that to maintain influence, however, a chief needed more than just high-ranking whakapapa:

*"But birth alone did not suffice for chieftanship. Personality and executive capacity were also required to maintain rank and authority. An incapable "ariki" ... would be set aside in practical affairs, and only called upon to perform certain religious rites."* (ibid, p. 132).

Another key aspect of chieftanship was access to wealth and the consequent ability to exert influence. Firth (1959) discusses the importance of wealth for a chief in order to maintain his position. Wealth was required to entertain travellers and visitors of note, as well as to keep strong relationships with relatives and tribal members. As in other Pacific societies, reciprocity (gift giving) was central to economic relations, with a chief's largesse in terms of gifts reciprocated through labour and other services (see Malinowski, 1921 and 1922). Firth (1959) also describes an entrepreneurial role for the chief:

*"The chief also acted as a kind of capitalist, assuming the initiative in the construction of certain "public works" ... It was through his accumulation and possession of wealth, and his subsequent lavish distribution of it, that such a man was able to give the spur to these important tribal enterprises"* (ibid p.133).

The chief also had an important fiduciary role "to act as trustee and administrator of tribal property". Firth summarises the economic role of the chief as follows:

*"As a generous host, as the entrepreneur in weighty economic affairs, as the distributor of goods to his dependents, and as the trustee of tribal property, the chief found the handling of wealth linked up with his rank and social status"* (ibid, p.134).

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<sup>11</sup> The first edition of Firth's book was published in 1929. Best's writings on Māori life began in 1895.

<sup>12</sup> Firth (1959, p.120) states: "Though it seems clear that the whānau, the extended family, bulked far more largely in social and economic affairs than the true [nuclear] family, the latter was not altogether negligible."

<sup>13</sup> This feature mirrors the same feature amongst the European nobility.

These historical characteristics of the tribal chief coupled with the traditional (and possibly ongoing) importance of kinship, mean that a number of findings in the international literature regarding the importance of family ties and collectivist economic beliefs (which are stronger in some societies than others) may translate through to Māori economic relationships today. However, as Firth pointed out, executive capacity was traditionally required for a chief to maintain rank and authority. Thus even in a traditional tribal setting, there is some ability to ensure that governance is not linked solely to the persona of an hereditary figure.

There is a scarcity of modern empirical literature investigating whether Māori and non-Māori share common beliefs and values (whether traditional or more modern) and whether they perceive differently the notion of well-being. A number of studies have examined whether there are differences in terms of measures of objective well-being (e.g., Cooke et al, 2007; Kiro et al, 2010) and subjective well-being (e.g., Ganglmair-Wooliscroft and Lawson, 2008; Sibley et al, 2011).<sup>14</sup> Each of these studies shows that Māori have lower (objective or subjective) well-being than do non-Māori. For instance, Kiro et al (2010) document that (in 2006) households with at least one Māori adult have worse outcomes than households with the same family structure with no Māori adult in terms of education, home ownership, household crowding, smoking prevalence and health. Furthermore, controlling for family structure, households with two Māori adults perform worse on each of these dimensions than do households with one Māori adult.<sup>15</sup>

The presence of differences in well-being determinants has been highlighted by Durie (2006) who postulates that there exist culturally-specific components of Māori well-being for which comparisons cannot be made with other ethnicities.<sup>16</sup> These components include utility gained from affiliation with one's iwi and hapū, visiting one's marae and participation in kapa haka.<sup>17</sup> Durie's conceptual model of Māori well-being (called "Tapa whā") proposes that overall well-being for Māori consists of four parts: i) Taha whānau (Family health); ii) Taha wairua (Spiritual health); iii) Taha tinana (physical health); and iv) Taha hinengaro (mental health). Durie (2006) contends that all four components must be maintained in order to remain in a high state of well-being. Spiller (2011) extends Durie's model to explicitly include environmental aspects. The importance of the environment for Māori well-being is reflected in a study by Pauling and Ataria (2010) who found that several iwi's concerns regarding the treatment of waste water had been ignored for decades by authorities, indicating a divergence in view between Māori concerns and

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<sup>14</sup> This study highlights the need to include control variables for confounding factors (such as employment status) to accurately estimate differences of interest.

<sup>15</sup> Intuitively, we expect that individuals in households with two Māori adults will tend to hold distinct Māori values and beliefs more so than individuals in households with one Māori adult (where that adult is in a couple situation). Of eleven indicators presented by Kiro et al, couple households with one Māori adult and no children perform worse than couple households with two Māori adults and no children in only two categories: "long work hours" and "rental affordability", but each of these could be a sign of material success rather than an objectively worse outcome.

<sup>16</sup> See also Wall et al (2011) who use data from the NZ General Social Survey to identify several different drivers of well-being of Māori compared to non-Māori.

<sup>17</sup> A marae is a communal meeting area, generally within the lands (rohe) of the iwi or hapū, that has great cultural significance. Kapa haka are Māori cultural activities.

the revealed-preference of the (primarily non-Māori) authorities.<sup>18</sup>

McNeill (2009) notes that many Māori move effortlessly between different world views of realities (especially between primarily Māori and primarily Pākehā views). Similarly, models of Māori identity (e.g., Durie, 1998a; Houkama and Sibley, 2010) establish that there are distinct groups of Māori ranging from those who are deeply enculturated (who are mostly older) to marginalised groups who don't identify with a specific culture, to bicultural groups who move between multiple cultures, and a younger renaissance group who confidently embrace Māori culture. Furthermore, economic outcomes differ considerably, on average, between those who identify solely as Māori and those who identify as Māori plus another ethnicity (Sin and Maré, 2004). Thus we shouldn't expect to observe completely demarcated beliefs and values between Māori and non-Māori. We also observe that Māori attitudes to older people appear to differ from the attitudes displayed by those of European extraction, and attitudes towards preserving past traditions appear to differ from some groups of non-Māori.<sup>19</sup> In section 4, we test whether there is indeed a difference in attitude towards elders (our test relates specifically to respect for parents) and along other cultural dimensions, including the importance of tradition, between Māori and non-Māori.

### 2.3. Māori Economic Characteristics

Prior to European settlement in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, Māori traditionally lived in small agricultural settlements growing limited crops supplemented by hunting and fishing (Firth, 1959). The society had been cut off from all other parts of the world for many hundreds of years and it had no access to metal tools of any kind. Early European contact brought new technologies and trading opportunities. Early accounts demonstrate that many Māori adopted these new technologies and began commercial enterprises that included export of commodities to Australia as well as other regions within NZ (Coleman et al, 2005). Many also joined the agricultural, forestry and mining workforces. However, European contact also brought disease. Pool (1991) estimates that the Māori population declined from 80,000 in 1840 to 44,500 in 1901 and life expectancy at birth fell to below 22 years between 1844 and 1874.<sup>20</sup>

While not analysing the causes, Coleman et al (2005) document that early Māori, while active in production and trade, “were slow to adopt a capitalistic ethic, and accumulated little capital”. Much Māori

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<sup>18</sup> Pauling and Ataria (2010) state: “For many years Ngāi Tahu, along with several other iwi, has consistently voiced a largely misunderstood and often lone concern for the way waste is managed in NZ ... Much of the concern has focused around the treatment and disposal of human effluent, especially where it is discharged to water, and of the need to protect significant cultural values such as mahinga kai and wāhi tapu. The importance of water and waterways to Māori underpins a broad support for alternative waste management strategies that involve land application. Despite these concerns being widely acknowledged and dealt with through a number of high profile legal disputes, Māori concerns have continued to grow. Many Māori believe that little is being done to understand Māori concerns and that there is a widespread lack of support for changing the current waste management paradigm in favour of more sustainable and alternative solutions that include some form of land treatment or that result in reduced use and degradation of water, and consequently valued mahinga kai resources.”

<sup>19</sup> The Awataha Marae project states that “*The mana of the elders is expansive. They are revered by the not-so-old because of their wisdom through experience, their wise counsel, their expertise in ngā taonga o ngā tupuna Māori (treasures of the ancestors) and their guidance in all things pertaining to the marae and to life in general. Their role ... is to “front” the marae, welcome the visitors (the women perform the karanga – welcome chant – and sing the waiata which relishes each speech), ensure that the kawa (procedure) is strictly adhered to and .. pass on their knowledge to the young*”.

(see: <http://www.awataha.co.nz/About+Us/What+is+a+Marae.html>).

<sup>20</sup> Pre-colonial life expectancy of Māori was estimated to be around 30 years, and to be 45 years once adulthood had been reached.

land was sold in the early to mid-19<sup>th</sup> century (often in questionable circumstances) and a sizeable portion was also confiscated by Government during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century land wars. In 1840, Māori owned 29.9 million hectares of land, falling to 15.3 million ha (in 1852), 5.0 million ha (in 1891), 2.2 million ha (in 1920) and to a low of 1.2 million ha (in 1986). Thereafter, several settlements between Crown and Māori relating to historical injustices saw total Māori land holdings rise to 1.5 million ha (in 1996). While sale at low prices and seizure of land was one reason for the lack of capital accumulation by Māori, 19<sup>th</sup> century European commentators also noted a lack of a thrift culture in Māori (Coleman et al, 2005, p.13). In 1885, von Sturmer noted that Māori “of today are not as provident or industrious as those of former times” (Coleman et al, 2005, citing von Sturmer in NZ Parliament House of Representatives, 1885, G.2 p.1). This reference suggests that pre-colonisation Māori may have been more “industrious” and that colonisation led to a change in values away from thrift (perhaps due to factors like shortened life expectancy and land expropriation). Whether causally related or not, the lack of wealth amongst Māori continues to current times. Coleman et al (2005) report that in 2001, the median net worth of Māori adults was \$5,200, whereas the equivalent figure for European adults (in NZ) was \$86,500.

For much of the post-colonial period, the Māori population remained heavily rural. In 1926, only 16% of Māori lived in urban areas (compared with 59% of non-Māori) and even by 1956, only 35% of Māori were located in urban areas. Subsequent urbanisation raised this percentage to 84% by 2001. If many aspects of culture are slow to change, then the values that were relevant to a rural society may still today permeate the cultural norms of Māori more so than for non-Māori.<sup>21</sup> One factor that may have affected collectivism of Māori was the expansion during the 1930s depression of the welfare state, of which New Zealand was a pioneer (Sutch, 1966).<sup>22</sup> At the same time, existing Māori land holdings were developed into commercial farm units, providing jobs and incomes for local Māori (NZIER, 2003).

The collectivist approach to economic institutions within Māori society was reinforced by Government actions (supported by iwi leaders) from the 1980s onwards. Durie (1998b) cites the Māori Economic Summit (Hui Taumata) of 1984 as an event at which several government functions were devolved to tribal authorities based on an expectation that Māori were better able to provide certain services to their own constituency than was the state. Coleman et al (2005) note that following State promotion of Māori economic development by way of Māori owned and managed businesses, “new business enterprises were set up by a significant number of iwi organisations in the 1980s and 1990s often using capital or property transferred from the Crown under Treaty of Waitangi settlements.”

A comprehensive study of the asset base of ‘the Māori economy’ in 2010 estimated that its total size was \$36.9 billion (see BERL, 2010). These assets comprised approximately 6.4% of the country’s assets

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<sup>21</sup> Walker (1992, p. 502) describes changes facing rural Māori who emigrated to the cities as follows: “The migrants had to function as members of the urban community. Adjustments included finding regular employment, and commitment to the cash nexus by meeting obligations on mortgages, rents, power-charges, hire purchase and taxes.”

<sup>22</sup> Butterworth (1972) cites a survey in 1946 showing that slightly over a quarter of income in a representative Māori village comprised welfare benefits.

in all sectors other than Government Administration and Defence.<sup>23</sup> Conceptually, this study treated assets as being within the Māori economy if the relevant entity self-identifies as being part of the Māori economy (though several assumptions had to be adopted in the study without certainty of whether this self-identification does actually occur). The BERL study finds that \$10.6 billion of Māori assets are held within collectively managed vehicles including Māori trusts, Māori trustee land assets, Iwi treaty settlements, Māori trust boards, incorporations, boards, holding companies, mandated Iwi organisations and in post-settlement governance entities (Te Puni Kokiri, 2008). All of these entities are henceforth referred to as “Māori Trusts” for convenience.<sup>24</sup> Approximately 29% of all Māori assets are managed within these kinds of collective (unlisted) vehicles.<sup>25</sup> Few, if any, are subject to the threat of external takeover. In some cases (such as certain fisheries assets managed by iwi consequent to the Māori Fisheries Act 2004) central government legislation prevents or limits the sale of existing Māori interests.<sup>26</sup> The lack of takeover threat opens the possibility that some of these assets may not be managed in a manner that extracts full value.<sup>27</sup>

A question then arises as to whether the above kinds of governance structures are consistent with profit maximisation or with a broader set of objectives. Those other objectives may arise from the beliefs and values of Māori that include, but are not restricted to, the monetary value of the firm.<sup>28</sup> For example, an emphasis on collectivism and kinship ties may suggest that a stakeholder model, which seeks a balance among the interests of all those who bear a substantial relationship to the firm, is the preferred form of governance for Māori enterprises (vis-a-vis a shareholder model). Consequently in the next section, we describe a richer picture of the economic and non-economic beliefs and values of Māori and non-Māori within NZ by presenting evidence, for the first time, from a large survey data set. We focus on those survey questions that have been identified in the international literature as being relevant to economic

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<sup>23</sup> Of the \$36.9 billion asset base, \$0.3 billion are in mining and electricity, for which no comparable nationwide figures were presented. The small size of these sectors means that the percentage of Māori assets within the total (non-Government) economy should differ little from the 6.4% calculated for all other sectors.

<sup>24</sup> Examples are Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd (fisheries), Crown Forestry Rental Trust, Waikato Raupatu Lands Trust, Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, Poutama Business Trust and Te Whānau o Waipareira Trust.

<sup>25</sup> The BERL study assumes that Māori enterprises (excluding Trusts) have the same average number of employees by sector as in the total economy (with the average across the total economy being 9.5 employees per enterprise). Other studies have assumed that Māori enterprises are, on average, smaller than other enterprises, implying that BERL's estimated asset base of the non-Trust sector is likely to be an upper bound. By contrast, there is reasonable certainty over the (more objectively determined) data for Māori Trusts. Hence the Māori Trust sector is likely to comprise at least 29% of all Māori assets. This ratio appears to be larger than for NZ as a whole, despite the importance of agricultural cooperatives in the economy. Estimates of the size of the nation's cooperative sector vary. The UN Global Census on Cooperatives (Dave Grace, 2014) ranks NZ as having the world's largest cooperative sector according to employees as a ratio of population and according to cooperatives' *revenues* as a percentage of *total value added* (GDP). The latter figure is 20%, implying that value-added by cooperatives as a ratio of GDP is considerably less than 20%. According to the International Cooperative Alliance, 3% of NZ's GDP is generated by co-operatives. See: <http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-facts-figures>.

<sup>26</sup> The purposes of the Māori Fisheries Act 2004 include: “to provide for the development of the collective and individual interests of iwi in fisheries, fishing, and fisheries-related activities in a manner that is ultimately for the benefit of all Māori” and “to establish a framework for the allocation and management of settlement assets through (a) the allocation and transfer of specified settlement assets to iwi as provided for by or under this Act; and (b) the central management of the remainder of those settlement assets.”

<sup>27</sup> Te Puni Kokiri (2007) documents that for Māori trusts and incorporations which are registered under the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, the return on equity in 2005 (1.8%) and the return on total assets (1.2%) was broadly equivalent to the respective economy-wide returns in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector, but well below those of the total economy (10.2% and 4.0% respectively).

<sup>28</sup> Sen (1999, pp. 121) notes the similarities of “precapitalist values and habits of thought” with modern advocacy of protected markets and the “preservation of antiquated techniques and production methods in businesses owned and operated by a ‘protected bourgeoisie’”, and comments on the benefits of markets in reaping benefits by overcoming such restrictions.

outcomes and the design of institutions. Our results are benchmarked against a comparison of black and non-black Americans.

### 3. Data and Empirical Approach

The main source of our data is the World Values Survey (WVS). We use data on three waves conducted in 1998, 2004 and 2011. In total, a random sample of 330,354 people in 99 nations have been interviewed. The appendix contains more information on the survey questions. The WVS measures a variety of beliefs (positive statements about how the world works) and values (normative statements on how the world should work). Alternatively, beliefs can be thought of as a combination of the available information with a set of more stable individual values (that condition the acceptance/rejection of particular arguments).<sup>29</sup> At times, we will use ‘beliefs’ to encompass both beliefs and values. A challenge of our approach is to select out of these opinions an appropriate set to study. We study beliefs that are economically relevant, though also select a set of non-economic beliefs (some of which may indirectly affect economic outcomes) as a benchmark. Thus, our study is focused on two “cultural domains”, namely economic and non-economic.

#### 3.1. Economic Beliefs

In addition to the economics literature on the importance of cultural beliefs for economic outcomes (as discussed in section 2), there is also a vast literature in political science discussing the nature of political beliefs (e.g., de Tocqueville, 1856, and Lipset, 1979. See also the discussions in Rokeach, 1973; Feldman, 1988; Inglehart, 1990, and Zaller, 1991). Some of this work emphasizes how left/right political choices reflect the basic cleavages in society. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, argue for the importance of the religious and the class (or economic) cleavage.

A large part of the variation in the latter that explains party choice can be captured by an individual’s belief concerning three basic economic questions:

1. Beliefs concerning the role that individual needs should play in determining income.
2. Beliefs concerning how desirable is private ownership of property.
3. Beliefs concerning the role of merit in determining income.

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<sup>29</sup> These positive views (i.e., beliefs) are not necessarily correct; they are just thought to be correct.

We use five different WVS questions to capture these different dimensions of ideology, starting with the role of needs. Two survey questions ask about attitudes towards poverty and inequality:

**1a.** “Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view?” The options are “1. They are poor because of laziness and lack of will-power, OR 2. They are poor because society treats them unfairly.”

**1b.** “Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?” The options are “(1) Too much or (2) About the right amount, OR (3) Too little.”

Turning attention to individual beliefs concerning how desirable is private ownership of property, we use the answer to the question:

**1c.** “There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint the managers; (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers. (3) The government should be the owner and appoint the managers; (4) The employees should own the business and should elect the managers.”

Finally, we turn attention to the role of merit in determining income (interpreting merit as payment in proportion to individual output). The following questions address beliefs concerning this issue:

**1d.** “Now we would like to know your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? ‘1’ means you agree completely with the statement on the left; ‘10’ means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between”:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections.				

**1e.** “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better-paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it (1) fair or (2) not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?”

### **3.2. Non Economic Beliefs**

It is less clear from the literature how a core set of “moral” beliefs that drive left and right choices can be described. Political scientists have argued for the importance of values that emphasize a libertarian/ authoritarian dimension as well as “post materialist” values that focus on quality of life rather than economic preservation (see Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), Flanagan (1987), Kitschelt (1994),

*inter alia*). For example, a representative paper is Knutsen and Kumlin (2005) who identify three central (non-economic) values used in party choice. These are as follows:

1. Beliefs concerning how desirable is the environment/ecology versus growth.
2. Beliefs concerning how desirable is a libertarian versus authoritarian type of society.
3. Beliefs about the importance of moral values (religious versus secular).

We use five different WVS questions to capture these different dimensions of moral ideology, starting with ecology versus growth orientation beliefs. The questions that appear related to these attitudes are:

**2a.** “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. (2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.”

**2b.** “For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views.” The options are “(1) We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR (2) We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.”

It is not so clear how to find survey questions that help to separately capture the other two dimensions of non-economic beliefs (i.e., libertarian/authoritarian tendencies and moral values). The following questions appear to focus on both of these dimensions:

**2c.** “I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? (1) Jews (2) Capitalists (3) Stalinists/hard line communists (4) Immigrants (5) Homosexuals (6) Criminals (7) Neo-Nazis/Right extremists (or country equivalent).”

**2d.** “With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? (1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them. (2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes.”

The question below appears to more heavily focus on the moral dimension:

**2e.** “Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card.” Card shows a 1 to 10 scale where “(1)=Never justifiable .. (10)=Always justifiable.”

### **3.3. Beliefs: Māori and non-Māori in New Zealand Compared**

In this section we compare the above economic and non-economic beliefs of Māori and non-Māori across the three waves of the WVS that include New Zealand, which were taken in 1998, 2004 and 2011. These waves sampled 55, 58 and 60 nations, respectively, around the world. The surveys were carried out by face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and older. The

ethnic identification of each person is based on the response to the following question:

“Which **one** of following best describes you: (1) Above all, I am a Māori; (2) Above all, I am a Pākehā; (3) Above all, I am a European; (4) Above all, I am a Pacific Islander; (5) Above all, I am an Asian; (6) Above all, I am a New Zealander first, and a member of some ethnic group second”.

We compare the beliefs of those people who identify themselves as Māori (i.e., who tick category (1)) with those who do not (i.e., who tick one of the categories (2-6)). Of the full sample, 7.7% identify as being Maori.<sup>30</sup>

Political affiliation is measured by the response to the question, “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Please circle one number”. A card shows a scale from 1 to 10, where “1=left .. 10=right”. We categorize a person as being ‘left’ if their response is 1-5 and as ‘right’ if their response is 6-10.

### 3.3.1. Economic Beliefs

Table A in the Appendix, compares economic beliefs when the population is divided into two sub-groups: Māori and non-Māori. Of Māori, 59.5% believe that people are living in need because society has treated them unfairly and the rest believe that the reason is laziness or lack of will-power (see Table A1). The proportions are similar for Māori men and women. By contrast, 40.6% of non-Māori believe that people in need have been treated unfairly. There are strong differences by political affiliation. Whereas only 30% of the ‘right’ (National party supporters) believe that need is due to unfair treatment, 58.4% of the ‘left’ (Labour party supporters) hold this belief. Hence Māori have slightly more “leftist” beliefs than (non-Māori) Labour supporters (i.e., nearly 60% of Māori blame an unfair society compared to 58% of Labour supporters).

Table A2 focuses on whether the government is doing too much, the right amount, or too little for people in poverty. Over 82% of Māori believe that the government is doing too little, whereas 51% of non-Māori share this belief. Of Labour supporters, 64.2% believe that too little is being done, compared to 36.7% of National supporters. Consequently, the proportion of Māori who want the government to do more greatly exceeds the proportion of (non-Māori) Labour supporters (i.e., 82% compared to 64%, respectively). Table A3 focusses on a governance issue: how business and industry should be managed. Of Māori, 54% believe that owners should run their businesses (compared to 46% who believe that businesses should be run by owners and employees together, or by the government, or by employees alone). By contrast, 69% of non-Māori believe that owners should run their businesses. There are strong differences

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<sup>30</sup> The NZ Census in 2006 asked the following question about ethnicity: “Which ethnic group do you belong to? Mark the space or spaces which apply to you. (1) New Zealand European (2) Māori (3) Samoan (4) Cook Island Māori (5) Tongan (6) Niuean (7) Chinese (8) Indian (9) other such as DUTCH, JAPANESE, TOKELAUAN. Please state”. Of all New Zealanders, 14.6% marked “Māori”. One reason for this number being higher than our (random) sample of survey respondents is that the WVS asks people to identify themselves in terms of a single ethnic group that includes “a New Zealander first, and a member of some ethnic group second”, whereas the NZ census allows people to tick multiple groups. However, Māori may also be under-represented in the WVS as occurs in other non-mandatory surveys.

by party affiliation. Of National supporters, 77% believe that owners should be in charge, compared to 61% of Labour supporters. Consequently, Māori are *less* supportive of owners running their businesses than (non-Māori) Labour supporters (i.e., 54% compared to 61%, respectively).

Table A4 shows the proportions of Māori and non-Māori who believe that “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” versus the alternative that “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success – it is more a matter of luck and connections”. People respond on a 10 point scale, depending on how strongly they hold these beliefs. We report the proportions who tick categories 1-5 (corresponding to hard work bringing a better life) versus the proportions who tick categories 6-10 (corresponding to success being more about luck and connections). Of Māori, 63% believe that hard work does bring a better life and 37% believe it is more about luck. For Māori men, only 59% believe that hard work pays compared to 66% of Māori women. Of non-Māori, nearly 78% believe that hard work pays. As before, Māori beliefs on the role of hard work are to the “left” of Labour supporters (i.e., 37% of Māori believe it is more about luck whereas only 26% of non-Māori Labour voters hold this belief). Table A5 reports beliefs on whether it is fair to pay a more efficient secretary more than a less efficient one who is doing the same job. Of Māori, 18% believe it is not fair, compared to 8% of non-Māori.

### **3.3.2. Non-Economic Beliefs**

Table B compares the non-economic beliefs of Māori and non-Māori, again divided by sex and political affiliation. The majority of Māori support environmental protection as being the top priority even when it comes at a cost to economic growth and jobs (i.e., 63% hold this belief). Māori women have a stronger preference in favour of environmental protection than Māori men (i.e., 69% for women compared to 56% for men). Of non-Māori, 45% support protecting the environment as the top priority, with a majority of 55% instead preferring economic growth. Labour and National supporters also have different beliefs on this question, with a majority of the right favoring economic growth as the top priority, whereas a majority of the left instead favor environmental protection.

Table B2 focuses on the question of whether tradition should be emphasized over high technology. Māori are strong traditionalists with 68% in favour, compared to 46% of non-Māori. Amongst non-Māori, the left and right hold similar views. However, there is a difference by gender, with 53% of non-Māori women favouring tradition, compared to 38% of non-Māori men. Table B3 reports that 11.4% of Māori dislike capitalists (more than any other group) whereas only 3.9% of non-Māori hold a similar belief. Table B4 focuses on the question of whether there is a duty to love and respect one’s parents, regardless of their faults, or whether parents must earn respect. Of Māori, 78% believe that one must always respect one’s parents, compared to 60% of non-Māori. This latter figure drops to 55% for (non-Māori) Labour supporters. Note that Māori beliefs are closer to those of right-wing (rather than left-wing) non-Māori voters (albeit with considerably greater Māori support for parental respect than even the right-wingers).

Table B5 shows the proportions of Māori and non-Māori who believe that “Abortion can never be justified” versus the alternative that “Abortion is always justifiable”. People respond on a 10 point scale, depending on how strongly they hold these beliefs. We report the proportions who tick categories 1-5 (i.e., abortion is never justifiable) versus the proportions who tick categories 6-10 (i.e., abortion is always justifiable). Of Māori, 66% believe that abortion is never justifiable, much higher than non-Māori at 55%, and especially (non-Māori) Labour voters at 51%. Again, Māori are closer to right-leaning voters with respect to this attitude, and again with a more marked view.

Tables C1-5 and Tables D1-5 report the comparable figures for the economic and non-economic beliefs of Americans, divided by (black and non-black) ethnicity, as a benchmark.

## 4. Results: Ethnicity and Beliefs

The previous section revealed differences between Māori and non-Māori in terms of their economic and non-economic beliefs. However these differences may not be caused by ethnicity, but instead by some other variable that is correlated with ethnicity. For example, if Māori are more highly represented in lower income and education groups, or have higher rates of unemployment, then their different beliefs (when compared to non-Māori) may be driven by these kinds of factors, and not by ethnicity per se.

### 4.1. Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy to find the determinants of these beliefs is to correlate them with each individual’s ethnicity, whilst also controlling for personal characteristics. We use a sample that covers the three waves of the WVS taken in 1998, 2004 and 2011. The regressions are of the form:

$$Belief_{it} = \alpha Ethnicity_{it} + \beta Income\ Quintile_{it} + \gamma Work\ Status_{it} + \delta Male_{it} + \psi Age_{it} + \theta (Age)_{it}^2 + \lambda Education\ level_{it} + u_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Belief_{it}$  refers to one of our set of economic or non-economic beliefs of individual,  $i$ , in year,  $t$ .

With respect to economic beliefs, we define the variable, *Unfair for Poor-L*, to equal 0 if the response is that people are poor “because of laziness or lack of will power”, and 1 if it is because “society treats them unfairly” (see question (1a) in Section 3.1). The extension *-L* indicates that under the natural interpretation of the variable, higher values are associated with a more left-wing ideological placement. Our second variable, *Government help Poor-L*, is defined to equal 0 when the response is that the government is doing either “too much”, or “about the right amount”, for those in poverty, and 1 if the response is that it is doing “too little” (see question (1b)). *Business Ownership-L* is set equal to 0 if the response is that “owners should run their business or appoint the managers” and 1 if it is “owners and employees should participate in the selection managers” or “the government should be the owner” or “employees should own the business” (see question (1c)). The variable, *Luck not Work-L*, is defined over a cardinal 1-10 scale based on

the extent to which a person believes that “hard work usually brings a better life” (=1) versus the view that “hard work doesn’t generally bring success – it is more about luck and connections” (=10) (see question (1d)). Finally we define the dummy, *Fair Pay-L*, to equal 0 if the respondent answers that it is “fair” for a less efficient secretary to be paid less than a “quicker, more efficient and more reliable” secretary and 1 if it is “unfair” (see question (1e)).

With respect to our set of non-economic beliefs, we define the variable, *Environment-L*, to equal 0 if the response is that “economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers” and 1 if it is “protecting the environment should be given priority” (see question (2a)). Again the extension *-L* indicates that under the natural interpretation of the corresponding variable, higher values are associated with a more left-wing ideological placement. Our second variable, *Tradition vs Technology-L*, equals 0 if the response is that “we should emphasize high technology more than tradition” and 1 if it is “we should emphasize tradition more than high technology” (see question (2b)). Note that higher values here may not unambiguously reflect leftist/rightist ideology since although technology that seeks to dominate nature may be rejected by leftists, conservative right-wingers are often traditionalists insofar as moral issues are concerned. We define *Capitalists-L* to equal 1 if a person says that they like capitalists the least, and 0 for all of the other groups that people may feel threaten the social and political order (see question (2c)). *Earn Respect-L* equals 0 if the response is that “regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them” and 1 if it is “one does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes” (see question (2d)). Lastly, *Abortion-L* is defined over a cardinal 1-10 scale based on to what extent the respondent believes that abortion is “never justifiable” (=1) versus that it is “always justifiable” (=10) (see question (2e)).

*Ethnicity<sub>it</sub>* is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent says of themselves, “Above all, I am a Māori”, and 0 otherwise (for those living in NZ). To compare whether differences in beliefs between Māori and non-Māori are typical of other countries’ experiences, we also run the same set of regressions for the US, where we divide the population into black and non-black Americans. For that purpose, we use the question, “Which of the following best describes you? Just call out **one** of the letters on this card. (1) Above all, I am an Hispanic American; (2) Above all, I am a Black American; (3) Above all, I am a white American; (4) Above all, I am an Asian American; or (5) I am an American first and a member of some ethnic group second”. In this instance, *Ethnicity<sub>it</sub>* is defined to equal 1 if the respondent says of themselves, “Above all, I am a Black American”, and 0 otherwise.

Each person’s income is proxied by *Personal Income Quintile<sub>it</sub>* which refers to a set of five dummies corresponding to each of the income quintiles (the base category is the bottom quintile). *Work Status<sub>it</sub>* is a set of dummies that correspond to whether one is unemployed, retired, a student, or at home (the base category is employed). We also include the dummy, *Male<sub>it</sub>*, and one’s age. Finally, we control for each person’s *Education level<sub>it</sub>*, which refers to a set of dummies depending on whether one has completed

primary, high school or university education (the base category is primary). Year dummies (*YEAR<sub>i</sub>*) are included and the (i.i.d.) error term is  $\varepsilon_i$ . The appendix provides data definitions.

## 4.2. Results – New Zealand

In Table 1 we explain our five different economic beliefs in terms of a person's ethnicity (Māori versus non-Māori) whilst controlling for their income, work status, sex, age and education level. Column (1) shows the results of a probit regression when the dependent variable is *Unfair for Poor-L* and reports marginal probabilities. Māori are 18.2% more likely to respond that people in need have been treated unfairly, compared to non-Māori, significant at the 1 percent level (i.e., the leftist belief is supported by Māori). There is a monotonically decreasing chance of believing in unfair treatment as one goes up the income quintiles, with the top quintile being 15.3% less likely to share this belief compared to people in the bottom quintile. By contrast, the unemployed (and students) are 22.8% (and 18.6%) more likely to support the idea that the poor are being treated unfairly, significant at the 1 percent level.

Column (2) reports the results when the dependent variable is *Government help Poor-L*. In this instance, Māori are 30.0% more likely to respond that the Government is doing “too little” for those in need. (i.e., the leftist belief is supported by Māori). The unemployed have a 19.2% higher chance of wanting more government help for the poor (compared to the employed) and there is again a monotonically decreasing chance of supporting the leftist belief as one goes up the income quintiles. Column (3) reports the results for *Business Ownership-L*. Māori are 12.6% more likely to support the belief that business and industry should not be run by the owners, or their appointed managers, compared to non-Māori. Column (4) shows that Māori are more likely to believe that success is driven by luck and connections than work, significant at the 1 per cent level, and the size of the effect is equal to moving 0.60 units on a (cardinal) 10 point scale.<sup>31</sup> Alternatively, if one creates a new binary variable by assigning the survey responses from 1-5 to a single category called “work”, and the survey responses from 6-10 to a single category called “luck”, then Māori are 11.5 percentage points more likely to believe that success is driven by luck. Finally, column (5) shows that Māori are 5.9% more likely than non-Māori to believe that it is not fair for a more efficient and more reliable secretary to be paid more than another doing the same job. Those with a high school or University education tend to hold the opposite view, and are 4.3% and 6.4% less likely, respectively, to hold this belief. Similarly, those people in the higher income quintiles and males are also less likely to say that paying the better secretary more is unfair.

In summary, across all of our measures of economic beliefs, Māori are significantly more in favour of the leftist belief compared to non-Māori, after controlling for other personal characteristics. The sizes of the effects are large. In other words, there appears to be a pure “ethnicity” effect.

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<sup>31</sup> If instead each of the 10 survey responses are treated as discrete and an ordered probit regression is run, then the cut points (standard errors) are equal to -1.3 (0.2), -0.8 (0.2), -0.3 (0.2), 0.04 (0.2), 0.4 (0.2), 0.7 (0.2), 1.0 (0.2), 1.3 (0.2) and 1.5 (0.2).

Table 2 reports the determinants of our five different non-economic beliefs. Column (1) shows the results of a probit regression when the dependent variable is *Environment-L*. Māori are 8.6% more likely to respond that protecting the environment should be given top priority (at the 1 per cent level) even at the cost of economic growth. There is also strong support for emphasizing the environment by those with a University education. These individuals are 22.3% more likely to give the environment priority, compared to those who have not completed high school. Column (2) reports the results when the dependent variable is *Tradition over Technology-L*. Māori have a 20.4% higher probability of supporting tradition over technology, compared to non-Māori. By contrast, those in the top income quintile are 11.3% less likely to support tradition than those in the bottom quintile. In column (3) the dependent variable is *Capitalists-L*. Māori have 5.1% higher probability of viewing capitalists as the least liked group in society.

Column (4) shows that Māori are 17.9% less likely than non-Māori to favour the belief that one does not have a duty to respect and love parents unless they have earned it, instead preferring the view that one should always respect one's parents "regardless of [their] qualities and faults".<sup>32</sup> Column (5) reports that Māori express a significant belief in the direction that abortion is not justifiable. The size of effect is equal to moving 0.64 units on a (cardinal) 10 point scale.<sup>33</sup> Alternatively, if one creates a new binary variable by assigning the survey responses from 1-5 to a single category called "anti-abortion", and the survey responses from 6-10 to a single category called "pro-abortion", then Maori are 10.1 percentage points more likely to be anti-abortion.

In summary, across each of these measures of non-economic beliefs, Māori are significantly in favour of the leftist belief, compared to non-Māori, with respect to *Environment-L*, *Tradition vs Technology-L* and *Capitalists-L* (where *Tradition vs Technology-L* is leftist in the sense that technology is not favoured when it threatens the environment). However, Māori are more in favour of the rightist belief with respect to *Earn Respect* and *Abortion*. That is, when it comes to authoritarian tendencies and moral values, Māori appear to be more inclined to respect authority figures, regardless of their qualities and faults, and tend to be religious conservatives in the sense of being averse to, for example, abortion.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Another WVS question that appears to focus on libertarian vs authoritarian tendencies and moral values is the following: "For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views. (1) To build good human relationships it is most important to try to understand other's preferences, or (2) To build good human relationships it is most important to express one's own preferences clearly". Māori are 14.1% more likely to respond that it's most important to express one's own preferences clearly, compared to non-Māori, after controlling for our set of personal characteristics.

<sup>33</sup> If instead each of the 10 survey responses are treated as discrete and an ordered probit regression is run, then the cut points (standard errors) are equal to -1.1 (0.2), -0.9 (0.2), -0.7 (0.2), -0.5 (0.2), -0.03 (0.2), 0.3 (0.2), 0.5 (0.2), 1.0 (0.2) and 1.2 (0.2).

<sup>34</sup> Regression results show similar Māori conservatism regarding other moral issues like homosexuality.

### 4.2.1. Further Tests: Time Trends and Demographic Differences

In this section we test for whether there are trends in the economic and non-economic beliefs of Māori, compared to non-Māori, over the period from 1998 to 2011, by interacting a time trend with our ethnicity variable. That is, we run the following regressions for each of our beliefs:

$$Belief_{it} = \alpha_1 Ethnicity_{it} + \alpha_2 Ethnicity_{it} * TIME\ TREND_t + \beta Personal\ Characteristics_{it} + u_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where *Personal Characteristics<sub>it</sub>* refers to our income, work status, sex, age and education level controls. With respect to economic beliefs, the only significant trend detected is the increasing support by Māori for the government to do more to help the poor (compared to non-Māori). Between 1998 and 2011 the proportion of Māori believing that “too little” is being done for those in poverty rose from 81.1% to 83.6%. However over the same period the proportion of non-Māori holding this belief fell from 61.0% to 36.2%. With respect to non-economic beliefs, none showed any evidence of a significant time trend (consistent with the idea that many cultural traits are slow moving).

One can also test for whether the differences in beliefs between Māori and non-Māori vary according to, for example, age and education levels, by interacting our personal characteristic controls (see equation (1)) with the ethnicity variable. The evidence suggests that younger Māori (<50 years old) are less inclined to support their elders’ view that the government should do more to support those in poverty, whereas for non-Māori, age has no effect.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, although a university education is associated with being more pro-environment (over economic growth) for non-Māori, it is not associated with making any difference to the beliefs of Māori.

### 4.2.2. Results – United States

Tables 3 and 4 report the corresponding set of results for the US, where the ethnicity variable is now defined according to whether one is a black, or non-black, American. In Table 3, blacks are significantly more likely to support the belief that people live in need because society has treated them unfairly (see column (1)) and also that the government is doing too little to help those in poverty (see column (2)). In other words, their beliefs are in the “leftist” direction, similar to Māori in NZ, with respect to these two questions. However in columns (3-4) there are no significant differences between black and non-black Americans in terms of how business and industry should be managed, and of whether or not hard work brings success. Finally, in column (5), black Americans are 9.6% more likely (significant at the 1% level) to support the belief that a more efficient secretary should be paid the same as a less efficient one, compared to non-black Americans (i.e., the more “leftist” belief).

Table 4 presents the results for our set of non-economic beliefs. In column (1), blacks are 20.5% less likely to believe that protecting the environment should be given priority, preferring instead economic

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<sup>35</sup> Results available on request.

growth and jobs. In columns (2-3) there are no significant differences between blacks and non-blacks with respect to *Tradition vs Technology-L* and *Capitalists-L*. Columns (4-5) show that black Americans are more likely to favour the authoritarian belief that one must always respect one's parents, regardless of their qualities, and are also more likely to hold conservative beliefs on moral issues like abortion.

In summary, black Americans' economic beliefs are significantly to the left of non-black Americans for three out of our set of five questions (i.e., *Unfair for Poor-L*, *Government help Poor-L* and *Fair Pay-L*) and are not significantly differently for two of them (i.e., *Business Ownership-L* and *Luck not Work-L*). This lies in contrast to Māori economic beliefs that are always significantly to the left of non-Māori beliefs.

With respect to non-economic beliefs there are even more striking differences. Black Americans are significantly less likely to believe that the environment should be given top priority, compared to non-blacks, whereas Māori hold the opposite belief, compared to non-Māori. Furthermore, whereas Māori favour more tradition over high technology, and consider capitalists to be more threatening to the social order than other groups, no such effects are present for blacks. In other words, Māori may be described as having more "leftist" beliefs, compared to non-Māori, across all three of these questions, whereas blacks have more "rightist" beliefs than non-blacks on the environment and there are no differences on the role of tradition and the desirability of capitalists. Finally, both Māori and blacks more strongly believe that parents should be respected, regardless of whether they've earned it, and that abortion is not justifiable, compared to others in their respective countries.

## 5. Implications and Conclusions

A growing body of international research establishes that individual, group and national outcomes depend, in part, on culture and institutions. Within NZ, national institutions are uniformly adopted, but sub-national cultural norms have sharply different distributions that are related to ethnicity. We make no normative assessment about the merits of different cultural norms within ethnic groups. However, we can provide some positive assessments about the economic implications that flow from them.

While there are large overlaps between Māori and non-Māori beliefs, our results suggest that Māori are more likely to believe: (a) people are in need because society is unfair; (b) government is doing too little to help people in poverty; (c) owners should not run businesses by themselves; (d) luck and connections matter more than hard work for success; (e) it is not fair to be paid more for better performance whilst doing the same job as someone else; and (f) capitalists are more threatening to society than other groups. These views are consistent with a 'left-wing' view of economic relations. Māori are also statistically more likely to consider that: (g) the environment should get priority over economic growth. On other matters, Māori are relatively conservative, favoring: (h) an emphasis on tradition over technology; (i) respect for one's parents no matter what their faults; and (j) a view that abortion cannot be justified. Overall, our

findings suggest that Māori beliefs are more aligned with giving importance to collectivism, non-materialism, the environment and kinship ties, relative to non-Māori.

When we compare the NZ outcomes with the American ones, we find both significant cases of agreement and disagreement. Black Americans' beliefs (relative to non-blacks) concur with those of Māori (relative to non-Māori) for the economic questions relating to poverty and fairness [(a), (b) and (e) above]. They also concur with those of Māori for the moral questions relating to parental respect and abortion. However, unlike within NZ, the questions relating to business ownership, luck versus work, capitalists as a threatening group and tradition versus technology [(c), (d), (f) and (h)] show no ethnic divide (statistically) within the US. In other words, black Americans appear to have bought into the capitalist system more than Māori (relative to the dominant group). Importantly, and in stark contrast to Māori, black Americans favour economic growth over the environment, possibly reflecting the fact that Māori consider themselves native to NZ whereas black Americans trace their roots to a different continent.

We cannot say whether the determinants of Māori beliefs that are less favourable to capitalism pre-date the colonisation experience, or are related to historical injustices and grievances, or are related to more recent experiences of discrimination.<sup>36</sup> Whatever the cause, the international literature suggests that some of the gap between Māori and non-Māori economic outcomes may be attributed to cultural differences in values and beliefs. In particular, a belief that luck and connections is more important to personal advancement (than is hard work) can lead to lower personal levels of achievement and less social mobility. Emphasis on family (and kinship) respect can lead to more family-owned firms that tend to under-perform other firm types (due to governance and capital constraints). An emphasis on tradition over technology is likely to inhibit innovation and entrepreneurship. Similarly, giving priority to the environmental over economic growth can inhibit commercial exploitation of Māori-owned natural resources relative to non-Māori (although we are not aware of any research on this factor). Each of these elements is consistent with the finding that Māori economic outcomes and many social outcomes (e.g., for health) suffer relative to those of non-Māori, even after controlling for family structure and education.

A recent literature in economics has begun to try to explain the causes of cultural beliefs. For example, personal experience of private ownership of property can strengthen materialist and individualist beliefs and make people more pro-market (see Di Tella, Galiani and Shargrodsky, 2007).<sup>37</sup> This finding raises the prospect that allocating shares in collective vehicles like Māori Trusts to individual iwi members may assist in changing beliefs in favour of the free market for those who receive shares. However, historical experience of land-loss through the sale of dissipated Māori ownership of land may be a constraint on

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<sup>36</sup> Planned future research using the Statistics New Zealand Te Kupenga survey will enable us to control better for such issues (at both an individual and an iwi level) although the beliefs and values questions unfortunately differ from those in the WVS.

<sup>37</sup> See also Guilinao and Spilimbergo (2014) who find people who have experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck and connections than merit, support more government redistribution, and tend to vote for left-wing parties. Di Tella, Dubra and MacCulloch (2010) show how greater dependence on oil leads to a similar set of beliefs (that diminish the role of individualism). Similarly, corruption also undermines the belief that effort ultimately pays off and that everyone gets their just desserts, leading to a greater demand for government intervention to punish the undeserving capitalists (see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009).

following this path. Cultural heroes are sometimes considered to affect beliefs about whether the world is just. To the extent that American blacks consider examples, like Barack Obama, as providing demonstrable evidence of advancement depending on individual effort, their belief in the ‘American dream’ may be strengthened. Interestingly, our survey evidence suggests that American blacks are significantly more likely than Māori in NZ to believe that effort matters (see Tables A4 and C4 and column (4) in Tables 1 and 3).

Our survey evidence showing that significant differences between Māori and non-Māori exist across every category of economic and non-economic belief also has relevance for crafting institutions within NZ. Given this dispersion of beliefs, creating a common set of rules for the whole population becomes harder. A number of studies demonstrate that there is greater adherence to rules at national, local and workplace levels when those affected by decisions are involved in the drafting of the rules (see, for example, Bardhan, 2000; Frey, 1998; Fabling and Grimes, 2014). When there is a minority indigenous ethnicity that has different cultural norms from the mainstream and is not heavily involved in the mainstream political process, this research suggests the need for special efforts to engage that group in the drafting of rules that affect all of society. NZ legislation over recent decades has tended to formalise such an approach.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the responsibility of councils to extend beyond consultation. Resource Management Act case law (which deals especially with environmental outcomes) establishes that local authorities have a responsibility to incorporate tangata whenua (local Māori) interests into their decision-making. Such consultation and responsibilities may help to ensure that cultural traits that are of special importance to Māori are encapsulated in national institutions.

With respect to the design of Māori enterprises (at the sub-national level) one may expect to see a strong reflection of the cultural differences identified by our survey data.<sup>39</sup> Our findings that Māori beliefs are more aligned with collectivism, non-materialism and kinship ties, compared to non-Māori, may explain why Māori enterprises are built more on a stakeholder, than a shareholder, approach (the latter being the dominant form of governance of larger firms in NZ). Although the stakeholder model has advantages in terms of balancing diverse parties’ interests, there are arguments that it comes at the expense of economic efficiency (since stakeholder firms no longer become focussed on the singular goal of raising shareholder returns).<sup>40</sup> However, to the extent that the ‘Māori economy’ is being built around institutions that are consistent with Māori beliefs, those institutions may still be optimal in the sense of maximising overall well-being (which may depend on a broader set of outcomes than solely monetary ones).<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For example, the Resource Management Act 1991, the Historic Places Act 1993, the Biosecurity Act 1993, and the Local Government Act 2002, have requirements for local councils to consult with Māori.

<sup>39</sup> See Denzau and North (1994) who argue how “institutions clearly are a reflection of the evolving mental models”.

<sup>40</sup> For a discussion of different kinds of governance systems, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who ask “How effective is the political and economic market place in delivering efficient governance? .. While our survey has described some evidence in this area from the US, our understanding of the politics of corporate governance around the world remains extremely limited” (pg 774).

<sup>41</sup> Two prominent Māori academics, Love and Love (2014), state: “Māori businesses tended to have a wide range of structures in the early 2000s, ranging from a conventional business structure (such as a sole trader, partnership or company) to a marae-, whānau- or iwi-based structure. These businesses did not always follow the generally accepted economic models of best managerial or commercial practice. Collectively owned tribal-based structures sometimes impeded efficient decision-making, management and reporting. ... Cultural and social issues, such as the dependence of family groups on business for financial support or employment, often affected Māori businesses and their

One method adopted by some iwi to enhance efficiencies from their holdings of tribal assets has been to form a fully iwi-owned investment entity that is responsible primarily to maximise returns. For instance, Tainui Group Holdings Ltd states:<sup>42</sup>

*Our role is to manage the commercial assets of the Waikato-Tainui people. Our core business is property investment and development. Our strategy is to identify and grow high quality assets, and generate income from them. With this income we aim to provide consistent, long-term dividends to current and future generations of Waikato-Tainui.*

Similarly, Ngāi Tahu Holdings Corporation Ltd states:<sup>43</sup>

*Ngāi Tahu Holdings Corporation Ltd is a long-term intergenerational New Zealand focused investor with an active approach to investment, managing assets and governance. It is the investment company of the Ngāi Tahu Charitable Trust of which Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu is the sole Trustee. Ngāi Tahu Holdings Corporation's role is to create wealth by using the assets, allocated to it by the Trust, to operate as a profitable and efficient business.*

However while these structures draw attention to the wealth-creation role of these two organisations (a major factor in guiding their commercial decisions) they still operate within a framework of monopoly kin-based ownership that is not subject to external accountability. The corporate finance literature shows how the threat of external takeover may be important to ensure that returns are maximised.<sup>44</sup> If a firm under-performs then equity holders typically have the right to replace management, but when ownership is disperse, each individual equity holder has little incentive to monitor the actions of management or the directors closely.<sup>45</sup> Consequently, provided a firm's shares can be traded, an important disciplining mechanism is the threat of takeover.<sup>46</sup> The lower level of corporate takeovers in continental Europe compared to the US and UK is often linked to differences between the Anglo-Saxon shareholder and the Continental European stakeholder approach to governance.<sup>47</sup> Stakeholders, like employees, who may be affected by a takeover, may not wish one to succeed. In a similar way, the stakeholder emphasis of entities in the 'Māori economy' may be resulting in an aversion to takeover threats.

To improve the efficiency of Māori Trusts, whilst retaining certain institutional features that reflect Māori beliefs and values, other paths adopted by related organisations may be worthy of consideration. One alternative is that followed by NZ's largest agricultural cooperative, Fonterra. The dairy cooperative

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chances of succeeding. The 'tātou tātou' (we all look after each other) philosophy often makes it hard for Māori business owners to say no when asked to give away products or services."

<sup>42</sup> See: <http://www.tgh.co.nz/>.

<sup>43</sup> See: <http://www.ngaitahuholdings.co.nz/group-profile/>.

<sup>44</sup> With uncertainty, although internal decision-making within a firm can often prove superior to, and more flexible than, external contracting, it is also capable of resulting in decisions that favour decision-makers' interests over shareholders. Typically, investors are interested in cash-flows from the firm, whereas management also have an interest in the private benefits that they can derive (see Hart, 2001). Private benefits include prestige, patronage and (legal, but inefficient) diversion of funds to other projects by way of contract.

<sup>45</sup> This economic concept of ownership as control, rather than as one of residual profit recipient, is close to the Māori concept of *tino rangatiratanga*.

<sup>46</sup> Evidence of the positive effects of the takeover threat on firm performance is widespread (for useful surveys, see Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, find that, prior to the rise in takeover activity in the 1980s, managers were loyal more to the corporation than to shareholders while boards "tended to be cosy with management, making board oversight weak". Even those firms that were not actually taken over often decided to restructure in response to hostile takeover pressure. See also Shleifer, 1998, and Megginson and Netter, 2001, for evidence of improved corporate performance following privatization of state owned corporations (with potential for subsequent takeover).

<sup>47</sup> See Clerc, Demarigny, de Manuel and Valiante (2012) who discuss the relation between governance systems and the takeover market.

introduced shares that are tradeable only amongst eligible farmers, whilst other investors, who are not eligible to own shares in Fonterra, can invest in the Fonterra Shareholders' Fund (FSF) that gives investors access to the economic (but not governance) rights that they would have received had they owned a Fonterra share. Both the share-trading between farmers and access to the FSF has resulted in greater scrutiny of the organisation's performance by shareowners and market analysts. Another alternative is the partial sale of assets, while retaining majority ownership within the iwi. This alternative was followed by the NZ government in the sale of 49% of each of three major electricity suppliers formerly in full state ownership. Again, the listing of the shares - while retaining ultimate control within the state - has lifted scrutiny of firm performance by shareowners and market analysts.

In conclusion, this paper firstly uses new survey evidence to identify starkly different distributions in cultural beliefs and values between Māori and non-Māori. These cultural traits, which tend to be less pro-market for Māori, are often associated with lower economic prosperity. Secondly, the paper discusses how the design of the formal institutions that govern the 'Māori economy' appear to somewhat reflect those beliefs (which emphasize collectivism, non-materialism, environmental concerns and kinship). These formal institutions, many of which are new, will in turn shape economic outcomes and cultural beliefs in the future. The extent to which they will improve overall Māori well-being (which depends not only on income but also on non-economic factors, like the environment and kinship) is an open question. Only by furthering this kind of explicit understanding of the role of culture and institutions, can we construct paths to economic development for all New Zealanders that reflect the diversity of beliefs and values within the country.

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# Appendix

**Table 1: Determinants of Economic Beliefs in NZ: Māori and non-Māori Compared; 1998-2011**

Dependent	(1) <i>Unfair for Poor-L</i>	(2) <i>Gov't help Poor-L</i>	(3) <i>Bus. Ownership-L</i>	(4) <i>Luck not Work-L</i>	(5) <i>Same Pay-L</i>
<i>Ethnicity: Māori</i>	<b>0.182**</b> <b>(0.053)</b>	<b>0.300**</b> <b>(0.038)</b>	<b>0.126**</b> <b>(0.038)</b>	<b>0.601**</b> <b>(0.177)</b>	<b>0.059**</b> <b>(0.028)</b>
<i>Personal Income Quintile: 2<sup>nd</sup></i>	-0.065 (0.044)	-0.013 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.031)	<b>-0.449**</b> <b>(0.158)</b>	<b>-0.035*</b> <b>(0.014)</b>
3 <sup>rd</sup>	-0.070 (0.043)	<b>-0.081*</b> <b>(0.040)</b>	<b>-0.054</b> <b>(0.029)</b>	- <b>(0.151)</b>	<b>-0.043**</b> <b>(0.013)</b>
4 <sup>th</sup>	<b>-0.113**</b> <b>(0.043)</b>	<b>-0.162**</b> <b>(0.041)</b>	<b>-0.077**</b> <b>(0.028)</b>	<b>-0.592**</b> <b>(0.153)</b>	<b>-0.033*</b> <b>(0.014)</b>
5 <sup>th</sup>	<b>-0.153**</b> <b>(0.044)</b>	<b>-0.200**</b> <b>(0.042)</b>	<b>-0.116**</b> <b>(0.028)</b>	- <b>(0.153)</b>	<b>-0.068**</b> <b>(0.013)</b>
<i>Work Status: Unemployed</i>	<b>0.228**</b> <b>(0.053)</b>	<b>0.192**</b> <b>(0.046)</b>	<b>0.128**</b> <b>(0.049)</b>	<b>0.588**</b> <b>(0.227)</b>	<b>0.073*</b> <b>(0.040)</b>
Retired	<b>0.088*</b> <b>(0.040)</b>	-0.056 (0.035)	-0.038 (0.029)	0.065 (0.185)	0.011 (0.029)
Student	<b>0.186*</b> <b>(0.079)</b>	0.106 (0.067)	0.047 (0.061)	-0.372 (0.335)	0.016 (0.055)
At home	0.020 (0.049)	0.052 (0.041)	0.001 (0.038)	0.343 (0.231)	0.050 (0.042)
Male	-0.036 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.025)	<b>-0.043*</b> <b>(0.019)</b>	-0.073 (0.094)	<b>-0.029**</b> <b>(0.012)</b>
Age	<b>0.018**</b> <b>(0.005)</b>	0.003 (0.004)	<b>-0.008**</b> <b>(0.003)</b>	-0.005 (0.016)	-2.9e-4 (0.002)
Age squared	<b>-1.6e-</b> <b>(4.4e-5)</b>	-2.6e-5 (3.9e-5)	<b>6.9e-5*</b> <b>(2.9e-5)</b>	-1.3e-4 (1.7e-4)	-9.6e-6 (2.1e-5)
<i>Education level: High School</i>	-0.024 (0.050)	0.021 (0.047)	<b>-0.079*</b> <b>(0.037)</b>	-0.054 (0.184)	<b>-0.043*</b> <b>(0.020)</b>
University	<b>0.090</b> <b>(0.054)</b>	0.047 (0.050)	0.020 (0.039)	-0.067 (0.194)	<b>-0.064**</b> <b>(0.020)</b>
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.0
Number of observations	1,363	1,805	2,595	2,741	1,962

**Note:** Columns (1-3) and (5) are probit regressions with marginal probabilities reported. Column (4) is an OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at the 10% level; Starred-bold at the 5% level; Double-starred bold at the 1% level. The Economic Attributes have L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right) beliefs.

**Unfair for Poor-L:** "Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need? Here are 2 opinions: which is closest to yours? 1. They are poor because of laziness/lack of willpower, OR 2. They are poor because society treats them unfairly." (Unfair for Poor-L=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat. (2)).

**Government help Poor-L:** "Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little? 1. Too much, OR 2. About the right amount, OR 3. Too little." (Gov't help Poor-L=0 if cat.(1) or cat.(2) and =1 if cat.(3)).

**Business Ownership-L:** "There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? 1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers. 2. The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers. 3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers. 4. The employees should own the business and should elect the managers." (Business Ownership -L=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat.(2), cat. (3) or cat.(4)).

**Luck not Work-L:** "How would you place your views on this scale? '1' means you agree completely with the statement on the left; '10' means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. 1. In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life; 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10. Hard work doesn't generally bring success - it's more a matter of luck and connections".

**Same Pay-L:** "Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? 1. Fair, OR 2. Not fair." (Fair Pay-L=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat.(2)).

**Table 2: Determinants of Non-Economic Beliefs in New Zealand: Māori and non-Māori Compared: 1998-2011**

Dependent Variable	(1) <i>Environment-L</i>	(2) <i>Trad. over Tech.-L</i>	(3) <i>Capitalists-L</i>	(4) <i>Earn Respect-L</i>	(5) <i>Abortion-L</i>
<i>Ethnicity: Māori</i>	<b>0.086**</b> <b>(0.041)</b>	<b>0.204**</b> <b>(0.042)</b>	<b>0.051*</b> <b>(0.033)</b>	<b>-0.179**</b> <b>(0.032)</b>	<b>-0.638**</b> <b>(0.213)</b>
<i>Personal Income Quintile: 2<sup>nd</sup></i>	-0.043 (0.038)	0.026 (0.039)	-0.019 (0.012)	0.001 (0.033)	-0.229 (0.188)
3 <sup>rd</sup>	0.013 (0.036)	0.007 (0.037)	<b>-0.028*</b> <b>(0.011)</b>	0.009 (0.032)	0.014 (0.178)
4 <sup>th</sup>	0.004 (0.036)	<b>-0.098**</b> <b>(0.038)</b>	<b>-0.034**</b> <b>(0.011)</b>	0.044 (0.032)	0.157 (0.181)
5 <sup>th</sup>	-0.008 (0.037)	<b>-0.113**</b> <b>(0.037)</b>	<b>-0.043**</b> <b>(0.010)</b>	<b>0.094**</b> <b>(0.032)</b>	<b>0.543*</b> <b>(0.182)</b>
<i>Work Status: Unemployed</i>	0.014 (0.053)	0.050 (0.057)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.062 (0.045)	<b>-0.551*</b> <b>(0.273)</b>
Retired	-0.017 (0.043)	<b>-0.079*</b> <b>(0.037)</b>	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.101 (0.221)
Student	-0.035 (0.084)	0.014 (0.074)	-0.030 (0.011)	-2.7e-4 (0.062)	-0.642 (0.391)
At home	-0.067 (0.053)	-0.037 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.019)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.369 (0.271)
Male	-0.021 (0.022)	<b>-0.150**</b> <b>(0.023)</b>	0.005 (0.011)	<b>-0.043*</b> <b>(0.019)</b>	0.091 (0.111)
Age	8.9e-4 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-7.7e-4 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.024 (0.020)
Age squared	-5.3e-5 (4.0e-5)	1.1e-5 (3.6e-5)	1.9e-6 (2.1e-5)	-2.2e-5 (3.0e-5)	7.0e-5 (2.0e-4)
<i>Education level: High School</i>	0.027 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.047)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.039)	<b>0.484**</b> <b>(0.220)</b>
University	<b>0.223**</b> <b>(0.043)</b>	-0.049 (0.049)	-0.002 (0.019)	<b>0.099*</b> <b>(0.041)</b>	<b>0.895**</b> <b>(0.232)</b>
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.04
Number of observations	2,280	1,998	1,108	2,673	2,655

**Note:** Columns (1-4) are probit regressions with marginal probabilities reported. Column (5) is an OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at the 10% level; Starred-bold at the 5% level; Double-starred bold at the 1% level. The Non-Economic Attributes have L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right) beliefs.

**Environment-L:** "Here are 2 statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them is closer to your own point of view? 1. *Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs*, OR 2. *Economic growth and creating jobs should be top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.*" (*Environment-L*=0 if cat.(2) and =1 if cat.(1)).

**Tradition vs Technology-L:** "For the following statements, please tell me which is closest to your own view. 1. *We should emphasize tradition more than high technology*, OR 2. *We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.*" (*Tradition vs Technology-L*=0 if cat.(2) and =1 if cat.(1)).

**Capitalists-L:** "I'd like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? 1. *Jews*; 2. *Capitalists*; 3. *Stalinists / Hard line communists*; 4. *Immigrants*; 5. *Homosexuals*; 6. *Criminals*; 7. *Neo-Nazis / Right extremists.*" (*Capitalists-L*=1 if cat.(2) and =0 otherwise).

**Earn Respect-L:** "With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? 1. *Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them.* 2. *One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes.*" (*Earn Respect-L*=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat.(2)).

**Abortion-L:** "Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card. "Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where 1=Never justifiable, 10=Always justifiable."

**Table 3: Determinants of Economic Beliefs in the US: Black and non-Black Americans Compared; 1995-1999**

Dependent Variable	(1) <i>Unfair for Poor-L</i>	(2) <i>Gov't help Poor-L</i>	(3) <i>Bus. Ownership-L</i>	(4) <i>Luck not Work-L</i>	(5) <i>Same Pay-L</i>
<i>Ethnicity: Black</i>	<b>0.154**</b> <b>(0.052)</b>	<b>0.261**</b> <b>(0.048)</b>	0.022 (0.032)	0.219 (0.231)	<b>0.096**</b> <b>(0.025)</b>
<i>Personal Income Quintile: 2<sup>nd</sup></i>	<b>0.092</b> <b>(0.052)</b>	0.033 (0.048)	0.009 (0.032)	-0.197 (0.222)	-0.006 (0.019)
3 <sup>rd</sup>	0.004 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.047)	-0.001 (0.032)	-0.348 (0.222)	0.017 (0.020)
4 <sup>th</sup>	0.019 (0.051)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.034 (0.032)	<b>-0.652**</b> <b>(0.215)</b>	-0.013 (0.019)
5 <sup>th</sup>	0.075 (0.053)	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.047 (0.033)	<b>-0.483*</b> <b>(0.220)</b>	-0.028 (0.019)
<i>Work Status: Unemployed</i>	0.102 (0.067)	0.022 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.041)	0.233 (0.278)	0.016 (0.027)
Retired	0.078 (0.052)	0.012 (0.049)	-0.030 (0.036)	-0.178 (0.224)	-0.005 (0.022)
Student	<b>0.321**</b> <b>(0.098)</b>	0.014 (0.102)	0.050 (0.064)	0.260 (0.458)	0.005 (0.041)
At home	0.029 (0.056)	-0.035 (0.050)	-0.005 (0.038)	-0.151 (0.238)	-0.010 (0.022)
Male	<b>-0.062*</b> <b>(0.030)</b>	<b>-0.063*</b> <b>(0.028)</b>	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.121 (0.133)	<b>-0.035**</b> <b>(0.012)</b>
Age	0.003 (0.005)	-4.1e-4 (0.005)	0.004 (0.003)	0.034 (0.022)	1.8e-4 (0.002)
Age squared	-5.1e-5 (5.1e-5)	-3.8e-5 (4.8e-5)	<b>-7.5e-5*</b> <b>(3.6e-5)</b>	<b>-4.2e-4</b> <b>(2.2e-4)</b>	-5.0e-6 (2.1e-5)
<i>Education level: High School</i>	-0.048 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.030)	0.273 (0.199)	<b>-0.034*</b> <b>(0.016)</b>
University	-0.025 (0.048)	<b>-0.086</b> <b>(0.044)</b>	0.017 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.214)	<b>-0.072**</b> <b>(0.017)</b>
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.04
Number of observations	1,116	1,389	2,637	1,469	2,630

**Note:** Columns (1), (2), (3) and (5) are probit regressions with marginal probabilities reported. Columns (2), (3) and (4) are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at the 10% level; Starred-bold at the 5% level; Double-starred bold at the 1% level. The Economic Attributes have L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right) beliefs.

**Unfair for Poor-L:** “Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need? Here are 2 opinions: which is closest to yours? 1. They are poor because of laziness/lack of willpower, OR 2. They are poor because society treats them unfairly.” (Unfair for Poor-L=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat. (2)).

**Government help Poor-L:** “Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little? 1. Too much, OR 2. About the right amount, OR 3. Too little.” (Gov't help Poor-L=0 if cat.(1) or cat.(2) and =1 if cat.(3)).

**Business Ownership-L:** “There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? 1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers. 2. The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers. 3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers. 4. The employees should own the business and should elect the managers.” (Business Ownership-L=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat.(2), cat. (3) or cat.(4)).

**Luck not Work-L:** “How would you place your views on this scale? ‘1’ means you agree completely with the statement on the left; ‘10’ means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. 1. In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life; 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Hard work doesn't generally bring success - it's more a matter of luck and connections”.

**Same Pay-L:** “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? 1. Fair, OR 2. Not fair.” (Fair Pay-L=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat.(2)).

**Table 4: Determinants of Non-Economic Beliefs in US: Black and non-Black Americans Compared; 1995-1999**

Dependent Variable	(1) <i>Environment-L</i>	(2) <i>Trad. over Tech.-L</i>	(3) <i>Capitalists-L</i>	(4) <i>Earn Respect-L</i>	(5) <i>Abortion-L</i>
<i>Ethnicity: Black</i>	<b>-0.205**</b> <b>(0.033)</b>	-0.013 (0.050)	0.012 (0.035)	<b>-0.115**</b> <b>(0.022)</b>	<b>-0.379*</b> <b>(0.188)</b>
<i>Personal Income Quintile: 2<sup>nd</sup></i>	<b>0.090**</b> <b>(0.032)</b>	0.061 (0.049)	0.042 (0.038)	0.023 (0.034)	0.078 (0.219)
3 <sup>rd</sup>	<b>0.071*</b> <b>(0.033)</b>	0.030 (0.050)	0.049 (0.038)	-0.003 (0.033)	<b>0.436*</b> <b>(0.222)</b>
4 <sup>th</sup>	<b>0.060</b> <b>(0.033)</b>	-0.045 (0.049)	0.043 (0.035)	0.032 (0.035)	0.301 (0.223)
5 <sup>th</sup>	<b>0.089**</b> <b>(0.034)</b>	-0.052 (0.050)	<b>0.067*</b> <b>(0.037)</b>	<b>0.065</b> <b>(0.037)</b>	<b>0.763**</b> <b>(0.231)</b>
<i>Work Status: Unemployed</i>	0.008 (0.043)	<b>-0.120</b> <b>(0.063)</b>	<b>0.071</b> <b>(0.048)</b>	0.059 (0.040)	0.205 (0.247)
Retired	0.033 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.050)	0.015 (0.032)	0.020 (0.033)	<b>0.599**</b> <b>(0.215)</b>
Student	0.063 (0.065)	<b>-0.240*</b> <b>(0.109)</b>	<b>0.117</b> <b>(0.085)</b>	<b>0.116*</b> <b>(0.066)</b>	0.556 (0.387)
At home	-0.005 (0.040)	0.006 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.032)	0.032 (0.035)	<b>-0.873**</b> <b>(0.227)</b>
Male	0.011 (0.021)	<b>-0.060*</b> <b>(0.029)</b>	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.120)
Age	0.005 (0.003)	<b>0.009</b> <b>(0.005)</b>	0.002 (0.003)	6.8e-4 (0.003)	-0.015 (0.020)
Age squared	-5.0e-5 (3.7e-5)	-7.1e-5 (4.9e-5)	-1.5e-5 (3.1e-5)	-1.8e-5 (3.1e-5)	-8.4e5 (2.1e-4)
<i>Education level: High School</i>	0.045 (0.031)	-0.059 (0.045)	<b>0.082*</b> <b>(0.035)</b>	-0.013 (0.027)	<b>0.299</b> <b>(0.181)</b>
University	<b>0.150**</b> <b>(0.031)</b>	<b>-0.130**</b> <b>(0.048)</b>	<b>0.184**</b> <b>(0.042)</b>	<b>0.088**</b> <b>(0.028)</b>	<b>0.975**</b> <b>(0.186)</b>
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.06
Number of observations	2,386	1,273	1,440	2,434	2,426

**Note:** Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) are probit regressions with marginal probabilities reported. Column (5) is an OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at the 10% level; Starred-bold at the 5% level; Double-starred bold at the 1% level. The Non-Economic Attributes have L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right) beliefs.

**Environment-L:** "Here are 2 statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them is closer to your own point of view? 1. *Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs*, OR 2. *Economic growth and creating jobs should be top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.*" (*Environment-L*=0 if cat.(2) and =1 if cat.(1)).

**Tradition vs Technology-L:** "For the following statements, please tell me which is closest to your own view. 1. *We should emphasize tradition more than high technology*, OR 2. *We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.*" (*Tradition vs Technology-L*=0 if cat.(2) and =1 if cat.(1)).

**Capitalists-L:** "I'd like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? 1. *Jews*; 2. *Capitalists*; 3. *Stalinists / Hard line communists*; 4. *Immigrants*; 5. *Homosexuals*; 6. *Criminals*; 7. *Neo-Nazis / Right extremists.*" (*Capitalists-L*=1 if cat.(2) and =0 otherwise).

**Earn Respect-L:** "With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? 1. *Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them.* 2. *One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes.*" (*Earn Respect-L*=0 if cat.(1) and =1 if cat.(2)).

**Abortion-L:** "Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card. "Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where 1=Never justifiable, 10=Always justifiable."

## Data Definitions

### Economic Beliefs

*Unfair for Poor-L*: Response to the World Values Survey (WVS) question: “Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view? (1) They are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, or (2) They are poor because society treats them unfairly.” (*Unfair for Poor-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)).

*Government help Poor-L*: Response to the WVS question: “Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little? (1) Too much (2) About the right amount, or (3) Too little.” (*Government help Poor-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is either category (1) or (2) and 1 if the answer is category (3)).

*Business Ownership-L*: Response to the WVS question: “There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint the managers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers, (3) The government should be the owner and appoint the managers, or (4) The employees should own the business and should elect the managers.” (*Business Ownership-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 otherwise).

*Luck not Work-L*: Response to the WVS question: “Now we would like to know your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? ‘1’ means you agree completely with the statement on the left; ‘10’ means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections.				

*Same Pay-L*: Response to the WVS question: “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? (1) Fair or (2) Not fair.” (*Fair Pay-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)).

### Non-Economic Beliefs

*Environment-L*: Response to the WVS question: “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth

and some loss of jobs. (2). Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” (*Environment-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)).

*Tradition vs Technology-L*: Response to the WVS question: “For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views. (1) We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR (2) We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.” (*Tradition vs Technology-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)).

*Capitalists-L*: Response to the WVS question: “I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? (1) Jews; (2) Capitalists; (3) Stalinists/hard line communists (or country equivalent); (4) Immigrants; (5) Homosexuals; (6) Criminals; (7) Neo-Nazis/Right extremists (or country equivalents).” (*Capitalists-L* is defined to equal 1 if the answer is category (2) and 0 otherwise).

*Earn Respect-L*: Response to the WVS question: With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? (1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them, OR (2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes. (*Earn Respect-L* is defined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)).

*Abortion-L*: Response to the WVS question: “Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card. Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where (1)=Never justifiable, (10)=Always justifiable.”

**Table A: Economic Beliefs in NZ: Māori versus non-Māori, World Values Survey (3 Waves) 1998, 2004 & 2011.**

A1: “Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need?”

Why do people live in need ?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Lazy	40.5	41.5	40.0	59.4	61.7	57.3	41.6	70.0
Society is Unfair	59.5	58.5	60.0	40.6	38.2	42.7	58.4	30.0

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=101 Māori and 1,275 non Māori; 1998 and 2011.

A2: “Do you think what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?”

How much is the Government doing for people in poverty?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Too much	6.9	8.0	6.3	11.0	11.9	10.2	7.7	13.0
Right Amount	10.8	10.0	11.2	38.0	38.5	37.6	28.1	50.3
Too little	82.3	82.0	82.5	51.0	49.6	52.2	64.2	36.7

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=130 Māori and 1,693 non Māori; 1998 and 2011.

A3: “There’s lots of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which comes closest to your opinion?”

Who should business & industry be run by?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Owners	54.1	55.1	53.4	69.0	72.0	66.5	60.9	77.2
Owners & employees	35.7	38.5	33.9	26.2	23.4	28.5	33.5	19.5
Government	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.1
Employees	9.2	5.1	11.9	4.5	4.2	4.8	5.1	3.2

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=196 Māori and 2,435 non Māori; 1998, 2004 and 2011.

A4: “How would you place your views on this [1-10] scale? In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life [1-5] Hard work doesn’t generally bring success – it’s more a matter of luck and connections [6-10]”.

In the long run, what brings a better life?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Work brings a better life	63.1	59.0	65.8	77.7	78.6	76.8	74.4	82.9
Luck & connections matter more	36.9	41.0	34.2	22.3	21.4	23.2	25.6	17.1

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=206 Māori and 2,574 non Māori; 1998, 2004 and 2011.

A5: “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?”

Is it fair that quicker secretary is paid more?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Fair	81.9	84.1	81.6	92.2	94.4	90.4	91.7	94.4
Not Fair	18.1	15.9	18.4	7.8	5.6	9.6	8.3	5.6

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=144 Māori and 1,849 non Māori; 1998 & 2004.

**Table B: Non-economic Beliefs in NZ: Māori versus non-Māori, World Values (Three Waves) 1998, 2004 & 2011.**

B1: “When discussing the environment and economic growth, which of these statements is closer to your own point of view?”

What should be the top priority?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Economic growth	36.6	44.3	30.8	44.8	45.5	44.3	37.4	50.2
Protecting the environment	63.4	55.7	69.2	55.2	54.5	55.7	62.6	49.8

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=161 Māori and 2,147 non Māori; 1998, 2004 & 2011.

B2: “Please tell me which is closest to your own view: We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, or We should emphasize high technology more than tradition”

Should we emphasize tradition or high technology?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Technology	32.0	37.5	27.9	54.0	61.7	46.9	54.6	59.2
Tradition	68.0	62.5	72.1	46.0	38.3	53.1	45.4	40.8

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=150 Māori and 1,881 non Māori; 1998, 2004 & 2011.

B3: “I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least”.

Which group do you like the least?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Others	88.6	88.5	88.6	96.1	96.1	96.1	95.3	97.4
Capitalists	11.4	11.5	11.4	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.7	2.6

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=70 Māori and 1,049 non Māori; 1998.

B4: “With which of these statements do you agree? Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love & respect them, or One doesn’t have the duty to respect & love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour & attitudes”.

Which is closest to your own views?	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Duty to respect	78.3	79.8	77.3	59.9	62.1	58.1	54.9	61.6
Respect is Earned	21.7	20.2	22.7	40.1	37.9	41.9	45.1	38.4

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=203 Māori and 2,509 non Māori; 1998, 2004 & 2011.

B5: “Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card”.

Abortion justified [1-5] or never justified [6-10] on 10 point scale	Māori			Non Māori				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Labour	National
Never Justified	65.8	68.3	64.0	54.6	53.2	55.5	51.0	55.9
Justified	34.2	31.7	36.0	45.4	46.8	44.5	49.0	44.1

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=193 Māori and 2,500 non Māori; 1998, 2004 & 2011.

**Table C: Economic Beliefs in the US: Black versus non-Black, World Values Survey (2 Waves) 1995 & 1999.**

C1: “Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need?”

Why do people live in need?	Black				Non Black			
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Lazy	46.4	45.9	46.9	61.8	65.3	58.4	51.1	72.5
Society is Unfair	53.6	54.1	53.1	38.2	34.7	41.6	48.9	27.5

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=110 Black and 1,071 non Black; 1995.

C2: “Do you think what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?”

[How much is] the Government doing for people in poverty?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Too much	6.6	1.5	12.7	35.6	38.5	32.8	26.3	46.8
Right Amount	26.2	32.8	18.2	27.3	27.6	27.1	26.8	27.1
Too little	67.2	65.7	69.1	37.1	33.9	40.1	46.9	26.1

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=122 Black and 1,281 non Black; 1995.

C3: “There’s lots of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which comes closest to your opinion?”

Who should business & industry be run by?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Owners	53.2	51.1	55.0	57.3	57.8	56.9	51.9	62.2
Owners & employees	35.9	36.8	35.1	35.1	34.3	35.8	39.6	31.5
Government	3.5	3.0	4.0	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.8
Employees	7.4	9.0	6.0	7.1	7.5	6.7	8.1	5.5

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=284 Black and 2,370 non Black; 1995 and 1999.

C4: “How would you place your views on this [1-10] scale ? In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life [1-5] ...

Hard work doesn’t generally bring success – it’s more a matter of luck and connections [6-10]”.

In the long run, what brings a better life?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Work brings a better life	74.6	73.5	75.8	81.0	81.7	80.3	77.2	83.4
Luck & connections matter more	25.4	26.5	24.2	19.0	18.3	19.7	22.8	16.6

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=130 Black and 1,355 non Black; 1995.

C5: “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other ?”

Is it fair that quicker secretary is paid more?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Fair	78.3	81.6	75.5	89.7	91.3	88.2	89.3	89.8
Not Fair	21.7	18.4	24.5	10.3	8.7	11.8	10.7	10.2

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=291 Black and 2,357 non Black; 1995 & 1999.

**Table D: Non-economic Beliefs in the US: Black versus non-Black, World Values (2 Waves) 1995 & 1999.**

D1: “When discussing the environment and economic growth, which of these statements is closer to your own point of view?”

What should be the top priority?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Economic growth	59.5	55.1	63.5	38.0	38.2	37.8	33.6	41.7
Protecting the environment	40.5	44.9	36.5	62.0	61.8	62.2	66.4	58.3

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=264 Black and 2,134 non Black; 1995 & 1999.

D2: “Please tell me which is closest to your own view: We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, or we should emphasize high technology more than tradition”

Should we emphasize tradition or high technology?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Technology	36.2	32.3	41.2	38.4	42.3	34.6	38.7	38.7
Tradition	63.8	67.7	58.8	61.6	57.7	65.4	61.3	61.3

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=116 Black and 1,172 non Black; 1995 & 1999.

D3: “I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least”.

Which group do you like the least?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Others	88.4	85.1	91.9	86.3	86.7	85.9	77.3	93.6
Capitalists	11.6	14.9	8.1	13.7	13.3	14.1	22.7	6.4

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=129 Black and 1,327 non Black; 1995.

D4: “With which of these statements do you agree? Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them, or One doesn’t have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes”.

Which is closest to your own views?	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Duty to respect	89.0	93.3	85.2	76.6	76.8	76.5	73.9	78.4
Respect is Earned	11.0	6.7	14.8	23.4	23.2	23.5	26.1	21.6

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=290 Black and 2,374 non Black; 1995 & 1999.

D5: “Please tell me if abortion can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card”.

Abortion justified [1-5] or never justified [6-10] on 10 point scale	Black			Non Black				
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	Democrat	Republican
Never Justified	75.0	70.7	78.7	69.6	69.6	69.5	63.1	73.9
Justified	25.0	29.3	21.3	30.4	30.4	30.5	36.9	26.1

All numbers are percentages; No. of respondents=288 Black and 2,352 non Black; 1995 & 1999.

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